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SYMPOSIUM
THE NEW "PROBLEM SOLDIER"-DISSENTER IN THE RANKS
HOWARD J. DE NIKEt
In days gone past, the professional military planner often spoke of
the "problem soldier." This was the GI who was difficult to teach, who
became a discipline problem, and who, in the commander's opinion, de-
manded an inordinate amount of attention.
With increasing frequency the "problem soldier" is viewed by com-
mand personnel within today's military as "the dissenting soldier."' The
Vietnam era in particular witnessed a widespread interest among active
duty military personnel, from all services, in the exercise of first amend-
ment rights.
The controversy surrounding the Vietnam war also brought intense
civilian interest in both the military and constitutional rights of, pri-
marily, enlisted personnel. There have been significant court decisions
which have bolstered these rights and which, consequently, are now em-
bedded in the foundation upon which the structure of the post-Vietnam
United States military will be erected
There are substantial signs that the exercise of rights of expression
and association among servicemen and women has not flagged since the
termination of the United States combat role in Vietnam. For the mili-
tary's part, nevertheless, there has been serious discussion of a return to
the so-called "brown-boot" Army, with a pre-Vietnam era emphasis on
rigid discipline, austere living conditions, strict dress code, and KP. The
theory espoused by the advocates of such a return is that the troops in
Vietnam proved to be an unreliable fighting force, deficient in training,
prone to drug use, and, at times, at the point of rebellion. Certainly the
history of the enlisted man's combat role in Vietnam is replete with
"fraggings, '" drug abuse, and combat refusals, as no other war in United
States war annals has been.4 However, it is dubious whether the practi-
" Member of the California bar; member of Lawyers Military Defense Committee,
nonprofit organization providing legal representation to American overseas military per-
sonnel from 1971 to 1973 in Vietnam, the Philippines and West Germany.
1. Military parlance seems to prefer the term "dissident." However, "dissenter"
will be used in this article, since it carries a less pejorative connotation.
2. See, e.g., Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972) ; Carlson v. Schlesinger,
364 F. Supp. 626 (D.D.C. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2170, D.C. Cir., Nov. 19, 1973;
Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d
245 2d Cir. 1971).
3. "Fragging," which derives from the term "fragmentation grenade," refers to an
attempt against the life of an officer or senior NCO by an enlisted man.
4. See generally Linder, The Denoralicaton of an Army: Fragging and Other
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cal remedy for the problems of the post-Vietnam military is the restora-
tion of the "brown-boot" Army of a bygone era.
Nonetheless, there is, in the thinking of many who advocate a return
to the disciplinary modes of the World War II military, a firm correla-
tion between what they saw as "the collapse of the armed forces" and the
rise of first amendment activities among military personnel.5 To them,
the GI who reads an "underground" newspaper, signs a petition seeking
a withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, or seeks counseling
about conscientious objection, is the same individual who would "frag"
an unpopular commander, sabotage a vessel, refuse to go on patrol, or,
what is perhaps worse, spread his ideas among other troops.
Today in West Germany, where the United States maintains its
greatest overseas concentration of forces (more than two hundred thou-
sand ground personnel), so-called "underground" GI newspapers continue
to publish. Though the names and places of publication are different
from the original GI newspapers that appeared in West Germany several
years ago,' there does appear to be a continuity in theme and general tone.
The periodicals attempt to publish monthly, featuring, about equally, ma-
terial written by local GI's and articles on broader topics7 taken from
other sources. The most noticeable difference between the current list
of GI newspapers in West Germany (and elsewhere) and those of the
past is the absence of the Vietnam war controversy. Now the emphasis
is on the Middle East, military drug policies, living and working condi-
tions for GI's, and amnesty for Vietnam war refusers.
The connection perceived between "underground" publications and
other first amendment activities, and the problems attendant upon the
role of the combat soldier in Vietnam, created and reinforced for many
commanders the conception of the dissenting soldier as the new "problem
soldier." The result has been an at times remarkably overt effort to sup-
press the exercise of free speech among the personnel in many commands.8
Withdrawal Symptoms, SATURDAY REVIEW, Jan. 8, 1972, at 12; S. LooRY, DEFEATED:
INSIDE AMERICA'S MILITARY MACHINE (1973).
5. Cf. Heinl, The Collapse of the Arined Forces, ARMED FORCES J., June 7, 1971,
at 30; R. BOYLE, THE FLOWER OF THE DRAGON: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE U.S. ARMY IN
VIETNAM (1972).
6. The names of some of the original newspapers were Propergander, Graffiti, and
Voice of the Lumpen.
7. Prominent are articles on "legal rights," such as search and seizure and the law
of nonjudicial punishment, and a popular item: "The Pig of the Month." This feature
is usually composed of a picture of an unpopular officer and a description of the conduct
which has made him disliked. It is probably the most popular item in GI newspapers.
8. Such actions often contravene the express language of Department of Defense
Directive 1325.6, which declares that mere possession of unauthorized publications is not
punishable, and that the publication of off-post newspapers, on one's own time, with
one's own materials, is not prohibited.
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Complicating the handling for the military of the new "problem
soldier" are the issues of race relations and drug use. The grievances of
black people have long been intermeshed with dissent in the armed forces
both during the Vietnam era and subsequently.' And the impact of drugs
on life styles among the youth of society has had a major concomitant
effect in the military. Thus, no discussion of dissent in today's military
can take place without reference to the issues of race, drugs, and the
civilian matrix of the American military.
THE SOURCES OF DISCONTENT
There is a certain irony that, contemporaneously with the formal
identification of "systemic discrimination" within the armed forces by
the military itself,0 there should be a dramatic increase in the enlistment
and re-enlistment of blacks in the Army." Moreover, it is an increase in
the face of the extensive notoriety accorded violent racial ruptures which
have occurred within the military in recent times, particularly upon United
States naval vessels.'
These outbreaks do not often bear a direct or easily identifiable rela-
tionship to dissent, either organized or diffuse, among black enlisted per-
sonnel. Rather, they appear to spring from spontaneous incidents in
which black enlisted men readily unite in reaction to a particular situa-
tion. There have, indeed, been organized groups of black enlisted per-
sonnel who have come together to further their collective goals,1" but such
groups have not been described as involved in the recent violent outbursts.
In virtually every instance in which a spontaneous incident has
erupted into violence, an examination of the surrounding circumstances
brought to light root feelings of resentment among the black persons in-
volved concerning unequal treatment by the command. Illustrative is a
case arising on the USS Little Rock, the Sixth Fleet flagship in the Medi-
terranean. On the evening of November 8, 1973, there were several racial
disturbances among the crew. Subsequently charged with riot and as-
sault were ten black sailors and one white. In a pretrial statement issued
9. See W. TERRY, BLOODS: THE BLACK SOLDIER FROM VIETNAM TO AmERICA
(1973).
10. See 1 REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY JUS-
TICE IN THE ARMED FORCES 19 (1972) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
11. Cf. 75 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 15, 1973, at 66, citing statistics from
the Army reflecting that in the first eight months after the end of the draft, twenty-five
percent of enlistees were black.
12. See, e.g., The Navy's New Racial Crisis, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 20, 1972, at 32.
13. Examples are Black Brothers United, a group formed in Vietnam with one of
its purposes to foster drug rehabilitation among blacks, and Unsatisfied Black Soldiers,
formed in Germany in 1970 seeking to improve conditions of blacks in the Army.
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to the press, the ten black accuseds, who were represented by Robert S.
Rivkin and William Schaap of Lawyers Military Defense Committee,
claimed:
For months prior to November 8, 1973, the younger black men
had been attempting to change conditions on the ship by going
to their race relations adviser, a black senior enlisted man, who
would then present their grievances to the captain. Many times,
the captain said he "would look into" their problems, but noth-
ing changed. The men in the Second Division of the ship re-
quested the removal of their immediate supervisor, a white petty
officer, but this was not done. They had complained about be-
ing cheated out of liberty through juggling of the duty rosters;
about blacks on sick call not receiving medical excuses from
duty as easily as whites; about having to do most of the demean-
ing jobs on the mess deck; about not having any blacks in the
serving line on the mess deck; about not being treated with re-
spect in general.'"
On the evening of the disturbances the immediate conciliatory efforts
by the Little Rock's Captain to cool "had little impact," in the words of
the statement, because, "[t] here were no reserves of good will for him to
draw on."'
This basic scenario repeats a pattern found in Vietnam, Korea, Ger-
many and aboard United States Navy ships, and evidences the degree to
which the services have failed to implement the recommendations of the
Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice' for attacking sys-
temic racism." Until commanders accept the need for race relations pro-
grams that are more than window dressing, until racial and ethfiic turbu-
lence is seen not as an embarrassment to be covered up, but as a sign of
shortcomings to be corrected, and until star and flag rank officers exert
the pressure to bring about these changes, there is little reason to expect
14. Statement of counsel, February 21, 1974, at 1-2, on file with the INDIANA LAW
JOURNAL.
15. Id. at 2.
16. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10.
17. The Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice was commissioned on
April 5, 1972, by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. It was composed of civilian
lawyers and jurists and the Judge Advocate Generals of each of the Armed Services.
Nathaniel R. Jones, General Counsel of'the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, and C.E. Hutchins, Jr., First Army Commander, were its co-chair-
men. The Task Force produced an extensive list of recommendations, covering not only
changes in the military justice system but also in such areas as equal opportunities pro-
grams, regulation of personal appearance, job assignment and testing, and administrative
discharges. See TAsx FORCE REPORT, supra note 10.
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that the number of incidents such as that aboard the USS Little Rock will
not continue to graw.
If one assumes that the effort to recruit an all-volunteer force will
result in a military heavily composed of black personnel, 8 the next ques-
tion is what impact, if any, this will have on the level of dissent. Cer-
tainly there are cogent reasons to expect that the stridency in which many
blacks of the sixties and early seventies grew of age will be translated
into demands for equal opportunity and treatment by new black enlistees.
There is every sign not only that this is occurring, but also that the
slogan employed by Navy recruiters-"You Can be Black and Navy
Too !"-is receiving a stringent test throughout the armed forces by en-
listees intent upon expressing themselves individually in terms of their
race. The Lawyers Military Defense Committee in Germany received
frequent complaints from black enlisted personnel ordered to remove sym-
bols of racial pride from their personal living areas of the barracks. One
man had a black, red and green pennant removed from his bunk, another
was ordered to take down from his locker a drawing of a black man with
the world on his shoulders. A black private was actually court-martialed
for "dapping disrespectfully."'" These manifestations of command re-
action range from insensitivity to overt prejudice and involve what some
might in the past have characterized as nonessential (i.e., nonmilitary)
minutiae. In fact, they portray a pervasive set of critical elements at play
between the minority enlisted man and his commander.
For example, in July 1973, Private (E-2) Raymond Olais was court-
martialed for willfully disobeying an order to remove a poster of Che
Guevara from his barracks living area.2" At his trial he testified that as
a Mexican-American he felt a strong identification with Latin-American
revolutionary figures, that his grandfather had fought with Emiliano
Zapata in Mexico, and that his identification with "Che" was in this same
tradition. In addition, he argued that no one had ever protested to him
concerning the poster. Olais' commanding officer testified that, while it
was true there were no complaints, he could not allow the poster because
if he were to do so, "then the blacks would put up posters of Malcolm X,"
which in turn would cause some whites to put up posters featuring the
18. See generally Janowitz, The Social Demography of the All-Volunteer Artied
Force, 406 ANNALs 86 (1973).
19. Special Court-Martial, United States v. Danforth, convened January 16, 1973,
Headquarters, U.S. Forces Support District, Baden-Wfirttemberg, APO 09154, Conven-
ing Orders Nos. 36, 31, and 15. "Dapping" is an elaborate handshake exchanged by
black GI's.
20. Special Court-Martial, United States v. Olais, convened July 6, 1973, Head-
quarters, U.S. Army Combat Equipment Group, Europe, APO 09166, Convening Orders
Nos. 29 and 28.
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Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan.21 Thus, Olais' commanding officer's
attitude toward the poster was merely a reflection of his overall view of
the viability of individual expression of racial and ethnic identity in the
military.
Perhaps ultimately of greater consequence to the question of in-
creased enlistment of blacks is its impact upon possible uses of the United
States military forces in the future. "What would black American
soldiers do when confronted with black African guerrillas?" was the
query raised by one commentator."
This question was anticipated by at least one American soldier in
West Germany during 1973. Private First Class Larry Johnson read an
account of the guerrilla war being waged against Portuguese forces in
Mozambique."3 He was impressed by the article, particularly by the de-
scriptions of atrocities and suggestions that the United States gave its
support to the Portuguese against the guerrillas. Johnson's commanding
officer rebuffed Johnson's attempts to dig deeper into the questions raised
by the article. The upshot of the episode was that Johnson ultimately
submitted a symbolic "resignation," refusing to wear his uniform, salute,
or report for work, in order to protest what he concluded to be United
States' support for colonialism in Africa and the indifference of his com-
mand to the issue.
The Army, in its turn, court-martialed Johnson upon seven specifica-
tions of violation of Articles 86, 89, and 90 of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justie.24 Johnson had sought repeatedly 'in the early stages of the
controversy to end the matter short of court-martial. The ultimate in-
capacity of the Army to achieve such a resolution is revealing in terms of
its response to dissent of this type.
Johnson's initial action in raising the question of Portuguese co-
lonialism at the base race relations council indicated his willingness to stay
within recognized channels, and for two months this was his approach.
21. The military judge granted a defense motion for a finding of not guilty on the
grounds that the commanding officer's reasons were too attenuated to meet the military
standard applicable to the exercise of rights under the first amendment, i.e., "a clear
danger to military loyalty, discipline, or morale." This standard appears to have de-
rived from United States v. Priest, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 564, 45 C.M.R. 338 (1972) ; see also
United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 518, 42 C.M.R. 120 (1970); United States v.
Gray, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 63, 42 C.M.R. 255 (1970); and United States v. Harvey, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 539, 42 C.M.R. 141 (1970). The "clear danger" standard is now embodied
in USAREUR Cir. 600-85 at § 14d(4).
22. Rogers, The Volunteer Army: Black Misgivings, 90 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY
252 (1973).
23. The Quiet War in Mozambique, EBONY, Feb. 1973, at 92.
24. Special Court-Martial, United States v. Johnson, convened June 18, 1973, Head-
quarters, Kaiserslautern Army Depot, APO 09054, Convening Orders Nos. 15, 14, 12,
and 3.
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His commanding officer did not believe that the United States could be
supporting Portugal with NATO-supplied weapons, as Johnson asserted.
His comment was that Johnson should devote further study to the mat-
ter. Johnson, who had taken black literature and history courses offered
by the Army in Germany, went back to the base library. There he found
what he felt to be ample substantiation of the charge of American support.
He returned with this documentation to his commanding officer, and was
partially able to convince him that what he was saying had merit. The
commanding officer suggested that Johnson write to his Congressman
about his objection to United States policy. Johnson felt this was merely
an effort to blunt his criticism, but he said he would do so, if the com-
manding officer would write also. The Captain responded that this was
impossible since his intention was to make the Army his career. Johnson
then said he believed it would be necessary to take stronger measures to
communicate his protest and mentioned a possible refusal to report for
work. The commanding officer, thereupon, ordered Johnson to report
for a psychiatric examination. The results of the examination were nega-
tive. The point is that the reaction of Johnson's commanding officer,
which is not atypical, inevitably proved to be an inadequate response to
the phenomena of dissent.25 Although the military jury returned a ver-
dict of conviction on six of the specifications, they were apparently suf-
ficiently impressed with Johnson and the evidence he presented in support
of his stand, that the sentence imposed was merely thirty days confine-
ment.2" Moreover, the jury took the rare action of recommending an
expeditious General Discharge, which was interpreted by those viewing
the trial as an implicit endorsement of Johnson's "resignation."27
COMMAND RESPONSES
Counter-Dissidence
The degree of frustration of the commander as he continues to grap-
ple with dissent, as exemplified by the Johnson and Olais cases, is sug-
25. Johnson's court-martial generated widespread attention among black service-
men in West Germany. During the two days of trial, spectators overflowed the court-
room-a situation virtually unheard of in the military, where most courts-martial are a
private convocation of the judge, the accused, and two military lawyers.
26. The maximum sentence imposable in the case was six months confinement at
hard labor.
Johnson's conviction was reversed by the convening authority who "disapproved the
findings" of the court-martial on the grounds that the military judge had improperly
failed to disqualify himself from the trial.
27. On August 7, 1973, Johnson was discharged administratively with a General
Discharge under Honorable Conditions. An application is now pending before the Army
Discharge Review Board to up-grade the discharge to fully Honorable status.
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gested in a scheme such as the short-lived 8th Infantry Division Counter-
Dissidence Program, which was promulgated on July 23, 1973, from the
Division Headquarters in West Germany. " In its basics the Counter-
Dissidence Program created a system whereby each unit commander in
the division was to send "[i]nformation on dissident activities . . . by
the most expedient methods to local counterintelligence agents of the 8th
MI [Military Intelligence] Company."29  Among the activities singled
out as "[i]ndicators of [d]issidence" were "[c]omplaints to NCO's
[noncommissioned officers], officers, IG [Inspector General], news
media, or Congressmen about living conditions, harassment, unfair treat-
ment, etc.""0  The list also included such activities as '[f]requent cir-
cumvention of the chain of command," attendance at unauthorized meet-
ings or "authorized meetings with controversial topics," distribution of
unauthorized publications, and "serious incidents . . .with racial over-
tones or motives . . . . ,,"' Annex C to the program provides a back-
drop to the entire scheme by defining "Dissidence" as "Manifestation of
a rejection of military, political, or social standards." 2
Clearly, contemporary conditions caused, at least, the command of
the 8th Infantry Division to feel justified in expanding the conception of
"dissidence" worthy of official cognizance. The result was the inclusion
of such fundamental first amendment rights as those of communication
with Congressmen, association to discuss grievances, and publication of
newspapers."3
Anti-Drug Campaign
Intertwined with the subject of dissent within today's military is the
issue of drug use and control. 4 The origins of the drug problem in the
military, at least insofar as the military has acknowledged it as a dis-
28. The highly questionable legality of the program (and, one suspects, its nervous
tenor) proved sufficiently discomfiting to the Army that it was publicly withdrawn on
the day following an article in the New York Times disclosing its existence. See N.Y.
Times, Aug. 10, 1973, § 1, at 1, col. 2. Cf. id., Aug. 8, 1973, § 1, at 4, col. 3.
29. Reg. No. 381-25, 8th Infantry Division, Comiter-Dissidence Program, July 23,
1973, on file with INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [hereinafter cited as Counter-Dissidence].
30. Id., Annex B.
31. Annex A, Counter-Dissidence, supra note 29. The list also expressly enumer-
ated such traditional types of "dissidence" as sabotage, subversion, and breach of security.
Id.
32. Annex C, Counter-Dissidence, supra note 29.
33. Curiously, when withdrawing the program, the Army took the occasion to an-
nounce that it was inappropriate, not due to legal infirmities, but rather, in part, "be-
cause soldier dissent within the command is presently at a very low level." N.Y. Times,
Aug. 10, 1973, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
34. The discussion of drugs is approached vis-a-vis the lower enlisted grades and
does not address the use of alcohol, nor the military's response to that specific problem.
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tinctly identifiable problem, are to be found in the Vietnam war years. As
the war became subject to mounting doubt in the United States, the Amer-
ican forces called upon to fight it began to exhibit increased disenchant-
ment with the task. A widespread troop use of marijuana was eventually
transmuted into a much more perilous involvement with heroin.
When this practice was reported, the alarm was immediately shock-
ing to a Congress already viewing the war with disfavor. Amended
Title 10, section 1071, United States Code, was the result of the congres-
sional reaction. This enactment charges the various military depart-
ments to
prescribe and implement procedures, utilizing all practical avail-
able methods . . . [to] identify, treat, and rehabilitate mem-
bers of the Armed Forces who are drug or alcohol dependent
persons .... "
Thereafter, an unparalleled Army program against drug usage began
to appear in December 1972 throughout European bases. The new ap-
proach was remarkably hard-line, all-encompassing, and explicitly puni-
tive. Typical features of the campaign as it initially appeared at Ameri-
can bases in Germany included such measures as removal of the doors
of the rooms of known or suspected drug users and requirements that
doors of known or suspected drug users remain unlocked. Those soldiers
identified as suspected or known drug abusers were forbidde .n to wear,
and in some cases possess, civilian clothing; known or suspected drug
users were ordered to surrender to their commanding officers their
driver's licenses and privately owned vehicle registration plates; known
or suspected drug users were prohibited from leaving the post at all;
whole companies of soldiers were assembled, strip searched, and had their
clothing and wallets searched; drug detector dogs were used to "inspect"
billets, including soldiers' beds; and rooms of known or suspected users
were stripped bare of all but essential items, e.g., beds, lockers, and mili-
tary clothing."
These "drug control" measures, and others like them, prompted a
flood of complaints to be brought to the Lawyers Military Defense Com-
mittee office in Heidelberg, West Germany, in the first months of 1973,
and, subsequently, the filing of Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway."
35. 10 U.S.C. § 1071 (Supp. II 1972).
36. See Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934 (D.D.C. 1974).
37. On January 14, 1974, Judge Gesell granted relief to plaintiffs on each of the
complaints mentioned in the text. Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp.
934 (D.D.C. 1974). Subsequently, following a Notice of Appeal filed by the Army, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stayed the order of the district court pend-
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This lawsuit is a class action on behalf of approximately 145,000 Army en-
listed men below the grade of E-5 stationed in Europe. It seeks to enjoin
the Army on constitutional grounds from enforcing the drug control pro-
gram in these principal aspects: the punitive use of evidence seized in
"inspections" without probable cause; the imposition of "administrative
sanctions" based upon alleged drug use without hearing; the dissemina-
tion of drug use intelligence to nonmilitary agencies; and the prohibition
of the display in barracks of posters and other items which in the com-
mander's estimation might constitute "a clear danger to military loyalty,
discipline, or morale.""8
Among those servicemen who protested the anti-drug program most
openly and vociferously were undoubtedly some who did so for self-serv-
ing reasons. But, in any event, the protestations were not pro-drug;
rather, they were directed at the inequities seen in the scheme, i.e., the
lack of a comparable program against alcohol abuse, the exclusive ap-
plicability of the program to the grades E-5 and below, and the ease with
which the program allowed the commander to deprive the enlisted person
of his or her newly gained prerogatives of the modem volunteer Army.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY DISSENT
A new interest among GI's in joining together to make their collec-
tive voices heard against the anti-drug program quickly rose to the surface.
At numerous bases ad hoc groups and committees were formed.' In
April 1973 in Heidelberg, an open meeting was held in which more than
seventy enlisted men and civilian supporters joined to discuss the pro-
gram.
In Berlin Democratic Club v. Schlesinger,"' filed by the American
Civil Liberties Union Foundation and the Lawyers Military Defense Com-
mittee, it was alleged that at the Heidelberg meeting, the United States
Army Intelligence command in Germany had conducted an intensive oper-
ation. The contention was that operatives infiltrated the meeting with
ing the appeal, which was ordered expedited. Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway,
appeal docketed, No. 74-1285, D.C. Cir., Feb. 25, 1974. The Appellees' motion for re-
consideration was denied en banc on April 5, 1974.
38. For the developmental background of this standard see cases cited note 21 supra.
Whether the level of drug use among American forces in West Germany justified
the Army's new program, or whether the program was designed to allow commanders
the range of options they desired to begin reshaping the post-Vietnam Army, is a subject
of underlying debate, not yet resolved. What is not challenged, at the moment, is the
occurrence of two phenomena after the program went into effect: an upsurge in both
dissent and the use of opiates among enlisted men.
39. Neu Ulm, Butzbach, Stuttgart, and Mainz were some of the locations of
American bases where these groups were formed. It was from therr as well as others,
that the eighteen named class representatives in Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway
were drawn.
40. Civil No. 310-74 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 19, 1974).
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hidden recording devices, that Army photographers surreptitiously photo-
graphed the participants at that counseling seminar as they entered and
left meetings, and that operatives assigned to attend the meeting sought
through "dirty tricks" to deflect the course of GI dissent in a provocative
and debilitating manner.
The suit focuses on the intense interest exhibited during 1973 by
Army Intelligence in the activities of American civilians supporting
American service personnel who were seeking to exercise constitutionally
protected rights. It claims that these activities contravene the United
States Constitution, violate the Army's own regulations, and are not jus-
tified by legitimate military necessity.
As an example of the type of action which the suit asks to have de-
clared unlawful and enjoined, it is claimed that the Berlin Democratic Club
in May 1973 circulated a petition among American military personnel in
Berlin, calling for the impeachment of the President of the United States.
The petition was ultimately mailed to the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives with approximately 350 signatures.
However, it is alleged, before it reached the Speaker, the petition
was intercepted by Army Intelligence, photographed, and the names of
the signatories then "recorded . . . in military intelligence files on 'dis-
sident persons.' ,"
Following a series of disclosures by former Army Intelligence per-
sonnel in 1970 concerning Army intelligence-gathering activities in the
United States42 and a legal challenge directed against those activities,4 3
the Army promulgated regulations 4" prohibiting, among a variety of ac-
tivities, "electronic surveillance of any individual or organization except
as authorized by law;" "covert or otherwise deceptive surveillance or
penetration of civilian organizations unless specifically authorized by the
Under Secretary of the Army;" attendance by Department of Defense
personnel at public or private meetings and demonstrations for the pur-
pose of information-gathering without specific prior approval of the Un-
der Secretary of the Army; or the maintenance of computerized data
banks relating to civil disturbances, individuals or organizations not af-
filiated with the Department of Defense, without specific prior approval by
the Under Secretary of the Army. The position of the Army was that
41. Complaint at 15, Berlin Democratic Club v. Schlesinger, Civil No. 310-74
(D.D.C., filed Feb. 19, 1974).
42. See, e.g., Pyle, CONUS Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian Politics,
WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Jan. 1970, at 4.
43. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
44. USARINT Reg. 381-100 (June 1, 1971), promulgated pursuant to Department
of Defense Directive 5200.27 (March 1, 1971).
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these prohibitions do not apply outside the geographic United States."'
The weighty questions raised in Berlin Democratic Club v. Schles-
inger are whether the plaintiffs can overcome the problems of "ripeness"
which were fatal to the claims by the plaintiffs in Laird v. Tatum," and
whether the Constitution follows the United States passport to protect the
lawful political activities of American citizens abroad from the "chilling
effect" of military intelligence surveillance. Because of a past correlation
between civilian support and dissent among the lower enlisted ranks, and
the failure of Laird v. Tatum to clarify the permissible range of military
intelligence activities where civilians are involved, Berlin Democratic Club
may well furnish a basis for gauging the direction and extent of future
dissent in the military.
CONCLUSION
While in Vietnam, the Philippines, and Germany during 1971-1973,
this author represented military personnel who wished to engage in a wide
variety of political actions.4" In each instance the client faced prosecu-
tion, threat of prosecution, direct harassment and intimidation or some
lesser indirect form, predicated upon his or her political actions.
The increased level of expectation, in terms of treatment, benefits,
and opportunities of contemporary enlistees, coupled with a growing
military role for blacks (and other minorities) and women, point to-
ward an expanding potential for dissent in the military during the years
ahead. The capacity of the military, particularly the Army, to meet this
prospect and maintain a necessary morale level will depend upon the will-
ingness of the military establishment to adapt itself to the expression of a
broader spectrum of opinion among its members and to permit full ex-
pression of such opinions through newly developed channels, as well as
by giving practical effect to those outlets already authorized.
45. Letter from Robert W. Berry, General Counsel, Department of the Army, to
Robert S. Rivkin, counsel, Lawyers Military Defense Committee, Sept. 11, 1973, on file
with the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL.
46. 408 U.S. 1 (1972). For discussions of the problem, see 41 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
385 (1972), 47 TUL. L. Rav. 426 (1973), and 18 VILL. L. REV. 479 (1973). In contrast
to plaintiffs in Laird v. Tatin, who alleged merely a generalized fear of being subjects
of military intelligence, the plaintiffs in Berlin Democratic Club alleged loss of employ-
ment, threats of deportation from the Federal Republic of Germany, breach of lawyer-
client confidentiality, and invasion of privacy, as well as being the actual subjects of a
variety of military intelligence activities.
47. Such "political actions" included petitioning for the withdrawal of American
forces from Vietnam, petitioning to halt American bombing in Southeast Asia, calling
for the impeachment of the President of the United States, petitioning for the legalization
of marijuana, participation in news conferences, publication of off-post newspapers and
distribution of such newspapers both on and off post.
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THE NEW "PROBLEM SOLDIER"
The emergence of an all-volunteer fighting force should not permit
loss of sight of the long-standing challenge which the traditional Ameri-
can view of its military has assumed." As Chief Justice Earl Warren
stated:
The military establishment is, of course, a necessary organ of
government; but the reach of its power must be carefully limited
lest the delicate balance between freedom and order be upset. The
maintenance of the balance is made more difficult by the fact that
while the military serves the vital function of preserving the ex-
istence of the nation, it is, at the same time, the one element of
government that exercises a type of authority not easily assimi-
lated in a free society. 9
The "citizen-soldier" remains both an ideal and a realistic goal which
a modem democratic society can and should steadfastly pursue.
48. P. BARNES, PAWNS: THE PLIGHT OF THE CITIZEN-SOLDIER (1972).
49. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181, 182 (1962).
